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Arbitrage and price revelation with private beliefs
Lionel de Boisde¤re,1
(July 2012)
Abstract
We extend the Cornet-de Boisde¤re (2002-2009) asymmetric information nite
dimensional model to a more general setting, where agents may forecast prices with
some private uncertainty. This new model drops both Radners (1972-1979) clas-
sical, but restrictive, assumptions of rational expectations and perfect foresight. It
deals with sequential nancial equilibrium, when agents, unaware of how equilibrium
prices or quantities are determined, are prone to uncertainty between - possibly un-
countable - forecasts. Under perfect foresight, the extended model coincides with
Cornet-de Boisde¤res (2002-2009). Yet, when anticipations are private, we argue,
any element of a typically uncountable minimum uncertainty set may prevail as an
equilibrium price tomorrow. This outcome is inconsistent with perfect foresight and
appeals for a broader denition of sequential equilibrium, which we propose hereafter.
By standard techniques, we embed and extend Cornet-de Boisde¤res (2002-2009)
results, to the innite dimensional model. The aim is to lay foundations for another
paper, showing that the concept of sequential equilibrium we propose may solve the
classical existence problems of the perfect foresight model, following Hart (1974).
Key words: sequential equilibrium, temporary equilibrium, perfect foresight, ex-
pectations, incomplete markets, asymmetric information, arbitrage.
JEL Classication: D52
1 Université Paris 1, Centre dEconomie de la Sorbonne, 106-112 Boulevard de
lHôpital, 75013 Paris, France. Email: lionel.de-boisde¤re@univ-paris1.fr
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1 Introduction
In economies subject to uncertainty and asymmetric information, agents are
traditionally assumed to have a model of how equilibrium prices are determined,
along Radner (1979), and to infer any additional information from comparing actual
prices and price expectations to their theoretical values. This so-called rational ex-
pectations hypothesis is convenient to deal with sequential equilibrium, but relies
on a strong assumption regarding agents capacities, and leads to standard cases of
non-existence of equilibrium. In Cornet-de Boisde¤re (2002-2009) and de Boisde¤re
(2007), we showed that treating asymmetric information without Radners ratio-
nal expectations assumption was always possible and improved existence results,
namely, it guaranteed the existence of equilibrium on a purely nancial market
under the same conditions as for symmetric information.
Our former model of asymmetric information still retained the standard se-
quential equilibriums second hypothesis, namely, Radners (1972) perfect foresight,
along which agents anticipate with certainty exactly one price for each commod-
ity (or asset) in each random state, which turns out to be the true price, if that
state prevails tomorrow. The rationale for doing this was technical. Indeed, keeping
perfect foresight, while dropping rational expectations, might have been di¢cult to
justify economically. Technically, however, perfect foresight is the easiest way to in-
sure equilibrium unfolds sequentially, as opposed to temporarily. That is, when all
uncertainty is removed, no agent would ever face bankruptcy or a welfare increas-
ing trade opportunity, and agents equilibrium decisions (ex ante) clear on markets
at all time periods. These outcomes no longer hold at a temporary equilibrium,
because agents may fail to forecast prices correctly at the outset.
Yet, perfect foresight is a su¢cient but, by no means, a necessary condition to
1
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guarantee sequential unfolding. Though it has remained the standard setting so far,
the perfect foresight model deals with a restrictive notion of sequential equilibrium,
which embeds feasibility and existence problems, akin to the rational expectation
models dealing with asymmetric information. In particular, the perfect foresight
model virtually requires the common knowledge of the equilibrium price, leads to
standard existence problems, and barely explains speculation or crash phenom-
ena, stemming from agents beliefs. These shortcomings appeal for an alternative
broader denition of the sequential nancial equilibrium concept. The main pur-
pose of this paper is to introduce such a concept and to lay foundations for proving
its existence in a companion paper, by presenting, rst and hereafter, a theory of
arbitrage under asymmetric information in an innite dimensional setting, where
agents are prone to uncertainty between (possibly uncountable) price forecasts.
We do this by extending our earlier model of asymmetric information, so as to
let agents be uncertain of future prices on each spot market, whenever required.
We introduce new concepts of beliefs, structures of beliefs and renements, no-
arbitrage prices and the information they reveal. These concepts enhance those of
our 2002 model to t with the new setting, and coincide with the earlier ones under
perfect foresight. Via standard, innite dimensional analysis techniques, we extend
the arbitrage properties of Cornet-de Boisde¤re (2002-2009) to the new model. In
particular, we show how agents, with no price model a la Radner, may still update
their beliefs from observing prices on current markets and, thereby, free markets
from arbitrage opportunities. Along this inference process, agents beliefs are said
to be price-revealed. Besides the new results, this paper embeds all main properties
demonstrated in the nite dimensional case by Cornet-de Boisde¤re (2002-2009) as
a particular application - since the two models coincide under perfect foresight.
2
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Formally, the model we propose is a two-period pure exchange economy, where
nitely many agents face an exogenous uncertainty, represented by nitely many
random states of nature (on which they may be asymmetrically informed), exchange
goods on spot markets, for the purpose of consumption, and trade, unrestrained, on
a (possibly incomplete) nancial market, so as to transfer wealth across periods and
states. At the rst period, besides the above exogenous uncertainty on the future
state of nature, agents may face an endogenous uncertainty on the future price,
in each state they expect. Namely, consumers have private sets of anticipations for
future spot prices, distributed along idiosyncratic probability laws, called beliefs.
The latter uncertainty on prices is traditionally referred to as endogenous, because
it concerns and may a¤ect the endogenous variables.
The models equilibrium, called correct foresight equilibrium (C.F.E.), is reached
when agents anticipate tomorrows true price as a possible outcome, and make op-
timal trade and consumption decisions today, given their preferences, which clear on
markets and remain optimal ex post, given prior portfolio choices. In a companion
paper, we show how a C.F.E. may be reached and why this equilibrium may solve
the classical existence problems, which followed, not only Radner (1979), but Hart
(1974). Whenever required, agents revised beliefs at the C.F.E. may be revealed
by the equilibrium price itself, in the sense dened above. This concept is, in-
deed, a sequential one, that is, di¤ers from the temporary equilibriums, introduced
by Hicks (1939), developed by Grandmont (1977, 1982), Green (1973), Hammond
(1983), Balasko (2003), among others, where agents forecasts need not be correct.
The paper is organized as follows: we present the model, in Section 2, its arbi-
trage properties, in Section 3, and inference mechanisms, in Section 4.
3
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2 The basic model
We consider a pure-exchange nancial economy with two time-periods (t 2 f0; 1g)
and two markets, a commodity market and a nancial market. There is an a priori
uncertainty at the rst period (t = 0) about which state s of a given state space
S will prevail at the second period (t = 1), when all uncertainty is removed. The
state of nature at t = 0 is non random and denoted by s = 0. The sets of agents
(or consumers), I := f1; :::;mg, of commodities, L := f1; :::; Lg, of states of nature,
S := f1; :::; Ng, and nancial assets, J := f1; :::; Jg, are all nite subsets of N.
Before presenting the model, we introduce notations, which are used throughout.
2.1 The models notations
Throughout, we denote by  the scalar product and by k:k the Euclidean norm on
an Euclidean space, by B(K) the Borel sigma-algebra of a topological space, K. We
let s = 0 be the non-random state at t = 0 and S 0 := f0g [ S. For all sets   S 0
and tuples ("; s; l; x; x0; y; y0) 2 R++LRR(RL)(RL), we denote by:
 xs 2 R, ys 2 RL the scalar and vector, indexed by s 2 , of (resp.) x and y;
 yl
s
the lth component of ys 2 RL;
 x 6 x0 and y 6 y0 (resp. x << x0 and y << y0) the relations xs 6 x
0
s
and
yl
s
6 y0l
s
(resp. xs < x
0
s
and yl
s
< y0l
s
) for all (l; s) 2 f1; :::; Lg;
 x < x0 (resp. y < y0) the joint relations x 6 x0, x 6= x0 (resp. y 6 y0, y 6= y0);
 RL := (RL), RL+ = fx 2 R
L : x > 0g and R+ := fx 2 R
 : x > 0g,
RL++ := fx 2 R
L : x >> 0g and R++ := fx 2 R
 : x >> 0g,
 M0 := f(p0; q) 2 RL+R
J : kp0k+ kqk = 1g;
4
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 Ms := f(s; ps) : ps 2 RL+; kpsk = 1g and M
"
s := f(s; ps) 2Ms : ps 2 ["; 1]
Lg, for s 2 S;
 M := [s2SMs and M" := [s2SM"s.
2.2 The commodity and asset markets
The L commodities, l 2 L, are used for the purpose of consumption and may be
exchanged between agents on spot markets. There are #S0 ex ante possible spot
markets, namely one in each state s 2 S0. In each state s 2 S, an expectation of
a spot price, p 2 RL+, is denoted by the pair !s := (s; p) 2 S  R
L
+ (which will also
stand for the spot price p in state s itself). At little cost, we normalize admissible
expectations and spot prices, in each state s 2 S, to the above dened set Ms.
Agents exchange commodities in order to increase their welfare. Ex post, the
generic ith agents welfare is measured by ui(x; y) 2 R+, where x := (x1; :::; xL) 2 RL+
and y := (y1; :::; yL) 2 RL+ are the vectors of consumptions, respectively, at t = 0 and
t = 1, and ui : R2L+ ! R+ is a utility function, assumed to be continuous.
Trade may take place because each agent, i 2 I, can rely on an endowment,
ei := (eis) 2 RLS
0
++ , of the L goods, which grants her the commodity bundle ei0 2 R
L
++
at t = 0, and eis 2 RL++, in each state s 2 S if this state prevails at t = 1. For the sake
of simpler notations, we henceforth let ei! := eis, for every triple (i; s; !) 2 IS0Ms.
The nancial market permits limited transfers across periods and states, via J
assets, also called securities, j 2 J := f1; :::; Jg, which are exchanged at t = 0 and
pay o¤ at t = 1. Assets may be nominal or real (i.e., pay o¤ in account units or in
commodities). For any spot price, or expectation, ! 2 M, the payo¤s, vj(!) 2 R,
of each asset j 2 f1; :::; Jg conditional on the occurence of !, dene a row vector,
5
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V (!) = (vj(!)) 2 RJ , and the mapping ! 2M 7! V (!) is continuous from the denition
and the continuity of the scalar product (since assets pay in money or commodities).
Provided she can a¤ord, every agent i 2 I may take unrestrained positions, zji 2 R
(positive, if purchased; negative, if sold), in every security j 2 f1; :::; Jg, which dene
her portfolio, zi := (z
j
i ) 2 R
J . When an asset price, q 2 RJ , is observed at t = 0, a
portofolio, z 2 RJ , is thus a contract, which costs q  z units of account at t = 0, and
promises to pay V (!)  z units tomorrow, for each spot price ! 2 M, if ! obtains.
Similarly, we henceforth normalize rst period prices, !0 := (p0; q), to the set M0.
2.3 Information and beliefs
During the rst period (t = 0), each agent receives a private information signal,
Si  S, which informs her that the true state, which will prevail at t = 1, will be
in Si. Henceforth, the collection (Si) of all agents signals is set as given and we
let S := \mi=1Si, referred to as the pooled information set. Agents are assumed to
receive no wrong information in the sense that no state of SnS will prevail, hence, S
is non-empty. Agents form private anticipations of future spot prices in each state
they expect, distributed along idiosyncratic probability laws. Formally:
Denition 1 For all probability , on (M;B(M)), and pair (! := (s; p); ") 2MR++, we
let B(!; ") := f(s0; p0) 2M : kp0 pk+js0 sj < "g and P () := f! 2M : (B(!; ")) > 0;8" > 0g
be a compact set, whose elements are called anticipations, expectations or forecasts.
A probability, , on (M;B(M)), is called a belief if the following Condition holds:
(a) 9" 2 R++ : P () M".
We denote by B the set of all beliefs. A belief 0 2 B is said to rene  2 B and we
denote it by 0  , if the following Condition holds:
(b) P (0)  P ().
6
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.53
Two beliefs, (; 0) 2 B2, are said to be equivalent, and we denote it by 0  , if both
relations 0   and   0 hold, and we let
o
 := f 2 B :   g be their equivalence
class. We denote by CB := f
o
 :  2 Bg the set of classes, forming a partition, of B,
and by P (
o
) the expectation support of any class
o
 2 CB, namely, the set of anticipa-
tions, P (
o
) := P (), which is common to all beliefs  2
o
, and which characterizes
o
.
We say that a class,
o
0 2 CB, renes
o
 2 CB, and denote it by
o
0 
o
, if P (
o
0)  P (
o
).
A collection of beliefs, (i) 2 Bm, is called a structure (of beliefs), and we denote
it by (i) 2 SB, if the following Condition holds:
(c) \mi=1 P (i) 6= ?:
Similarly, a collection of classes, (
o
i) 2 CB
m, is called a class structure (of beliefs),
and we denote it by (
o
i) 2 CSB, if \mi=1P (
o
i) 6= ?.
Let ((i); (0i)) 2 SB
2, (
o
i) 2 CSB and payo¤ mapping, V , be given. The couples, [V; (i)]
and [V; (
o
i)], are called, respectively, a structure and a class structure (of payo¤s and
beliefs). The structure (0i) is said to rene (i), and we denote it by (
0
i)  (i), if
the relations 0i  i hold for each i 2 I. The two structures are equivalent, and we
denote it by (i)  (0i), if both relations (i)  (
0
i) and (
0
i)  (i) hold. A renement,
(i ) 2 SB, of (i) 2 SB, is said to be self-attainable if the following Condition holds:
(d) \mi=1P (

i ) = \
m
i=1P (i).
The notions of renement and self-attainable renement are dened alike on CSB.
Remark 1 Without changing the papers results, a belief could be dened as a
probability on (M;B(M)), whose support cannot take arbitrary large or low values.
With normalized expectations this is stated by Condition (a). Under perfect fore-
sight, class structures, (
o
i) 2 CSB, and information structures, (Si), coincide, as well
as the above denitions of renements with Cornet-de Boisde¤res (2002).
7
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2.4 Consumers behavior and the notion of equilibrium
In this sub-Section, we assume that agents make their trade and consumption
plans after having reached a (nal) structure of beliefs, (i) 2 SB, and observed
the market price at t = 0, !0 := (p0; q) 2 M0, which are set as given and referred to
throughout. The generic ith agents consumption set is, then, dened as:
X(i) := C(f0g [ P (i);RL+) ,
where C(f0g[P (i);RL+) stands for the set of continuous mappings from f0g[P (i)
to RL+. A consumption, x 2 X(i), is, thus, a mapping, which relates continuously s =
0 to a (xed) consumption decision, x0 := x!0 2 R
L
+, at t = 0, and every anticipation,
! := (s; p) 2 P (i), to a random consumption decision x! 2 RL+ at t = 1, which is
conditional on the occurence of the spot price !, that is, of both state s 2 S and
price p 2 RL+, on the spot market, at t = 1.
Each agent i 2 I elects and implements a consumption and investment decision,
or strategy, (x; z) 2 X(i)RJ , that she can a¤ord on markets, given her endowment,
ei 2 RLS
0
+ , and her expectation set, P (i). This denes her budget set as follows:
Bi(!0; i) := f(x; z) 2 X(i)RJ : p0(x0-ei0) 6  qz; ps(x!-ei!) 6 V (!)z;8! := (s; ps) 2 P (i)g
.
An allocation, (xi) 2 X[(i)] := mi=1X(i), is a collection of consumptions across
consumers. We dene the following sets of attainable allocations, for every price
collection, (!s) := (!s)s2S 2 s2SMs, and attainable portfolios, respectively:
A((!s); (i)) := f(xi) 2 X[(i)] :
Pm
i=1(xi0-ei0) = 0;
Pm
i=1(xi!s -ei!s) = 0; 8s 2 S; s:t: !s 2 \
m
i=1P (i)g ;
Z := f(zi) 2 (RJ)m :
Pm
i=1 zi = 0g.
8
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Hence, only spot markets, whose price is commonly expected (or observed at
t = 0) by all agents, need clear, along the above denition of an attainable allocation.
Each agent i 2 I has preferences represented by the V.N.M. utility function:
uii : x 2 X(i) 7! u
i
i (x) :=
R
!2P (i)
ui(x0; x!)di(!)
.
The generic ith agents behavior is, then, to elect a strategy, which maximises this
utility function in the buget set, that is, a strategy in Bi (!0; i) := argmax(x;z)2Bi(!0;i) u
i
i (x).
The above economy is denoted by E , whose equilibrium is dened as follows:
Denition 2 A collection of prices, (!s) 2 s2S0Ms, beliefs, (i) 2 SB, and strategies,
(xi; zi) 2 Bi(!0; i), dened for each i 2 I, is a sequential equilibrium (respectively, a
temporary equilibrium) of the economy E, or correct foresight equilibrium (C.F.E.),
if the following Conditions (a)-(b)-(c)-(d) (resp., Conditions (b)-(c)-(d)) hold:
(a) 8s 2 S, !s 2 \mi=1P (i);
(b) 8i 2 I; (xi; zi) 2 B

i (!0; i) := argmax(x;z)2Bi(!0;i) u
i
i (x);
(c) (xi) 2 A((!s); (i));
(d) (zi) 2 Z.
Remark 2 Along Denition 2, a C.F.E. is reached when agents forecast prices cor-
rectly (Condition (a)), make optimal decisions at t = 0 (Condition (b)), which clear
on all markets at all dates (Conditions (c)-(d)), and is, indeed, a sequential equilib-
rium. At t = 1, agents never face bankruptcy and have no incentive to exchange on
the spot market. Under perfect foresight, the above sequential equilibrium concept
coincides with Cornet-de Boisde¤res (2002, Denition 2.3, p. 399).
9
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3 The arbitrage properties
We dene and characterize no-arbitrage prices and the information they reveal.
3.1 The models no-arbitrage prices
We start with a standard application of separation theorems in topological vec-
tor spaces, which yields a no-arbitrage characterization used throughout the paper.
Claim 1 Let  2 B and q 2 RJ be given. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) there is no portfolio z 2 RJ , such that  q z > 0 and V (!) z > 0 for every ! 2 P (),
with at least one strict inequality;
(ii) there exists a continuous mapping  : P ()! R++, such that q =
R
!2P ()
(!)V (!)d(!).
Remark 3 It follows from Claim 1, that if a belief,  2 B, meets the conditions
of Claim 1 for a given price, q 2 RJ , any other equivalent belief, 0  , meets the
same conditions. This will make Denition 3, below, consistent.
Proof Let  2 B and q 2 RJ be given.
(ii) ) (i) Assume that assertion (ii) holds, and, let z 2 RJ be given such that
 q  z > 0 and V (!)  z > 0 for every ! 2 P (). Assume, rst, that V (!)  z > 0, for some
! 2 P (). Then, the above inequalities V (!) z > 0, which hold every ! 2 P (), and the
continuity of V at ! 2 P () imply q  z =
R
!2P ()
(!)V (!)  zd(!) > 0, in contradiction
with the above relation -qz > 0. Hence, V (!)z = 0, for all ! 2 P (), which also yields,
from Assertion (ii), qz =
R
!2P ()
(!)V (!)zd(!) = 0, that is, assertion (i) holds. 
(i)) (ii) Assume that Assertion (i) holds and let P := fs = 0g[P () and C(P;R) be
the set of continuous (hence, Borel measurable) mappings from P to R, endowed with
the (well dened) operator (f; g) 2 C(P;R)2 7! < f; g > := f(0)g(0)+
R
!2P ()
f(!)g(!)d(!),
10
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the norm f 2 C(P;R) 7! kfk :=
q
f(0)2 +
R
!2P ()
f(!)2d(!), the induced metric and
topology. The set C(P;R) is a convex metric space, with the linear sub-spaces:
A := ff 2 C(P;R) : 9z 2 RJ ; f(0) =  q  z and f(!) = V (!)  z; 8! 2 P ()g;
A? := ff 2 C(P;R) : < a; f > = 0; 8a 2 Ag.
Let C(P;R+) and C(P;R++) be, respectively, the subsets of continuous non-negative
and strictly positive valued mappings of C(P;R). Assertion (i) is written A\ C(P;R+) =
f0g. Assume, by contraposition, that A? \ C(P;R++) = ?, i.e., Assertion (ii) fails.
Then, from the Interior Separating Hyperplane Theorem and the fact that A?
is a linear sub-space (see Aliprantis-Border (1999), pp. 188, 190), there exists a
nonzero continuous linear functional, ', which properly separates A? and C(P;R++),
and such that '(a) = 0 6 '(b), for every (a; b) 2 A?  C(P;R++).
From Riesz Theorem (see Aliprantis-Border (1999), p. 440), there exists f 2
C(P;R), such that '(h) = < f; h >, for every h 2 C(P;R). The linear space A is closed
hence, with obvious denition, A?? = A (Aliprantis-Border (1999), p. 215). Then,
from the above inequalities, the relations f 2 A?? \ C(P;R+)nf0g = A \ C(P;R+)nf0g
hold and contradict the above formulation, A \ C(P;R+) = f0g, of assertion (i). 
We can now dene and characterize arbitrage-free prices, beliefs, and structures.
Denition 3 Let a class structure of payo¤s and beliefs, [V; (
o
i)], a class of beliefs,
o
 2 CB, a representative belief,  2
o
, and a price, q 2 RJ , be given. The couples,
(V;
o
) or (V; ), are said to to be q-arbitrage-free (hence, arbitrage-free), or q to be a
no-arbitrage price of (V;
o
), or (V; ), if the following equivalent Conditions hold:
(a) there is no portfolio z 2 RJ , such that  q  z > 0 and V (!)  z > 0 for every
! 2 P () = P (
o
), with at least one strict inequality;
11
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(b) there exists a continuous mapping  : P ()! R++, such that q =
R
!2P ()
(!)V (!)d(!).
We let Q[V;
o
] be the set of no-arbitrage prices of (V;
o
) (or (V; )) and Qc[V; (
o
i)] :=
\mi=1Q[V;
o
i] be the set of common no-arbitrage prices of [V; (
o
i)]. The class structure
[V; (
o
i)] is said to be arbitrage-free (resp., q-arbitrage-free) if Qc[V; (
o
i)] 6= ? (resp.,
if q 2 Qc[V; (
o
i)]).We say that q is a no-arbitrage price (resp., a self-attainable no-
arbitrage price) of [V; (
o
i)] if there exists a renement (resp., a self-attainable rene-
ment), (
o


i )  (
o
i), such that q 2 Qc[V; (
o


i )], and we denote their set by Q[V; (
o
i)].
All above denitions and notations can be stated, equivalently from Remark 3, in
terms of any representative structure, (i) 2 mi=1
o
i. We then refer to Qc[V; (i)] :=
Qc[V; (
o
i)] and Q[V; (i)] := Q[V; (
o
i)] as, respectively, the sets of common no-arbitrage
prices, and no-arbitrage prices, of the structure [V; (i)]. When no confusion is pos-
sible, the reference to V may be dropped in all above denitions and notations.
Remark 4 We notice that a symmetric renement of any structure (i) 2 SB,
that is, a renement (0i)  (i), such that P (
0
i) = P (
0
1), for every i 2 I, is always
arbitrage-free along Denition 3. The latter Denition embeds and extends Cornet-
de Boisde¤res (2002) Denition 2.2 (p. 397). Henceforth, without recalling, we let
the reader notice the same conclusion for all subsequent denitions and properties.
The following no-arbitrage characterization will be used throughout the paper.
Claim 2 Given (
o
i) 2 CSB, (i) 2 mi=1
o
i and q 2 RJ , the following Conditions are
equivalent, the latter being called absence of future arbitrage opportunity (AFAO):
(i) the class structure (
o
i) (or, equivalently, the structure (i)) is arbitrage-free;
(ii) there is no portfolio collection (zi) 2 (RJ)I, such that
Pm
i=1 zi = 0 and V (!i) zi > 0
for every couple (i; !i) 2 I  P (i) = I  P (
o
i), with at least one strict inequality.
12
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Proof Let (
o
i) 2 CSB and (i) 2 mi=1
o
i be given.
(i)) (ii) Assume that (i) 2 SB is arbitrage-free. Set as given q 2 Qc[V; (i)], and,
for each i 2 I, a continuous mapping, i : P (i)! R++, such that q =
R
!2P (i)
i(!)V (!)di(!),
which exist from Denition 3. Assume that there exists (zi) 2 (RJ)I , such that
V (!i) zi > 0 for every (i; !) 2 IP (i), with at least one strict inequality. Then, sum-
ming up the latter relations, wheigthed by i(!), for every (i; !) 2 I  P (i), yields,
from above and the continuity of V ,
Pm
i=1 q  zi =
Pm
i=1
R
!2P (i)
i(!)V (!)  zidi(!) > 0,
which implies that
Pm
i=1 zi 6= 0 and, consequently, that Condition AFAO holds. 
(ii)) (i) Assume Condition AFAO holds. The proof is akin to that of Claim 1.
For each i 2 I, we let Pi := fs = 0g [ P (i), and C(Pi;R) be the set of continuous
mappings from Pi to R, endowed with the operator, (f; g) 2 C(Pi;R)2 7! < f; g > :=
f(0)g(0) +
R
!2P (i)
f(!)g(!)di(!), and the induced norm, metric and topology, as in
Claim 1. Then, we endow from above the set C := mi=1C(Pi;R) with the operator,
metric and topology of product spaces, let C+ and C++ be the subsets of non-negative
and strictly positive valued functions of C and A, A? be the linear sub-spaces:
A := f(fi) 2 C : (fi(0)) = 0; 9(zi) 2 RJI :
Pm
i=1 zi = 0; fi(!i) = V (!i)zi; 8(i; !i) 2 IP (i)g;
A? := ff 2 C : < a; f > = 0;8a 2 Ag.
The AFAO Condition is written: A \ C+ = f0g. If A?\ C++ = ?, the very same
arguments as in Claim 1 apply, and, as we let the reader check, yield a contradiction.
Hence, we may set as given (i) 2 A?\ C++ 6= ?. Then, by taking (zi) 2 (RJ)I , such
that (zi; zj) = ( z1; 0), for every (i; j) 2 I2, i 6= 1, j =2 f1; ig, the relation (i) 2 A? yields:
R
!2P (i)
i(!)V (!)  zdi(!) =
R
!2P (1)
1(!)V (!)  zd1(!), for every pair (i; z) 2 I  RJ .
Let q :=
R
!2P (1)
1(!)V (!)d1(!). From above, q =
R
!2P (i)
i(!)V (!)di(!), for every
i 2 I, which implies, from Denition 3, that q 2 Qc[V; (i)], i.e., assertion (i) holds. 
13
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3.2 Individual beliefs revealed by prices
First, we show a structure of beliefs admits a coarsest arbitrage-free renement.
Claim 3 Let a class structure of payo¤s and beliefs, [(V; (
o
i)], be given. Then, there
exists a unique coarsest arbitrage-free renement of (
o
i) 2 CSB, namely, a rene-
ment, (
o


i )  (
o
i), which satises the two following Conditions:
(i) [V; (
o


i )] is arbitrage-free;
(ii) every arbitrage-free renement of (
o
i) is a renement of (
o


i ).
The coarsest arbitrage-free renement, denoted
o
[V; (
o
i)] or
o
[(
o
i)], is self-attainable.
Proof Along Denitions 1 & 3, let (
o
i) 2 CSB be a given class structure, and
let R
(
o
i)
be the set of arbitrage-free renements of (
o
i), (partially) ordered by the
relation . This set, R
(
o
i)
, is non-empty, for it contains the symmetric self-attainable
renement of (
o
i), along Remark 4. A chain in R(oi) is a totally ordered subset,
say f(
o

k
i )gk2K, where K is a non-empty set, such that for every pair (k; k
0) 2 K2,
either (
o

k
i )  (
o

k0
i ) or (
o

k0
i )  (
o

k
i ). We set as given such a chain, f(
o

k
i )gk2K. Along
Denition 1, we let f(P ki )g := f(P (
o

k
i ))gk2K be its chain of supports and, for each
i 2 I, Pi := [k2KP ki  P (
o
i) be a compact set, and
o
i 2 CB be the class of beliefs with
support P (
o
i) = Pi. Then, by construction, (
o

k
i )  (
o
i)  (
o
i) holds, for every k 2 K.
Assume, by contraposition, that (
o
i) =2 R(oi)
, i.e., from Claim 2, there exists
(zi) 2 (RJ)I , such that
Pm
i=1 zi = 0 and V (!i)  zi > 0 for every couple (i; !i) 2 I  Pi,
with at least one strict inequality, say V (!1)  z1 > 0 for !1 2 P1. Since, for all k 2 K,
the class structure (
o

k
i ) 2 CSB is arbitrage-free and such that (
o

k
i )  (
o
i), the latter
relations imply, from Claim 2, that V (!ki )  zi = 0 for every triple (k; i; !
k
i ) 2 K IP
k
i .
Since V is continuous, the relation V (!1)  z1 > 0 for !1 2 P1 := [k2KP k1 implies that
there exists k 2 K and !k1 2 P
k
1 , such that V (!
k
1)  z1 > 0, in contradiction with
14
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the above equalities. This contradiction shows that (
o
i) 2 R(oi)
, hence, from above,
that (
o
i) is an upper bound of the chain f(
o

k
i )gk2K in R(oi). Along Zorns Lemma
(Aliprantis-Border, 1999, p. 14), R
(
o
i)
has a maximal element, that is, a renement,
(
o


i )  (
o
i), which satises Conditions (i)-(ii) of Claim 3, and which is unique from the
latter Condition (ii). Let
o
[V; (
o
i)] 2 CSB be that maximal element. From above, the
set R
(
o
i)
contains the symmetric self-attainable renement, which renes
o
[V; (
o
i)],
from Condition (ii). Hence,
o
[V; (
o
i)] is self-attainable. This completes the proof. 
We now study how prices may convey information in this model.
Claim 4 Let a class structure of payo¤s and beliefs, [(V; (
o
i)], and a price, q 2 RJ ,
be given. Then, for each i 2 I, there exists a set,
o
(V;
o
i; q) 2 ? [ CB, such that:
(i) either
o
(V;
o
i; q) = ?, or
o
(V;
o
i; q) 
o
i along Denition 1;
(ii) if
o
(V;
o
i; q) 
o
i, then, (V;
o
(V;
o
i; q)) is q-arbitrage-free along Denition 3;
(iii) every q-arbitrage-free renement of
o
i renes
o
(V;
o
i; q).
Moreover, for every pair (i; i ) 2 I 
o
(V;
o
i; q), there exists a continuous mapping
i : P (

i )! R++, such that q =
R
!2P (
i
)
i(!)V (!)d

i (!).
Proof The proof is similar to that of Claim 3. Let i 2 I, q 2 RJ , and a class struc-
ture, (
o
i) 2 CSB, along Denition 1, be given. Let R(oi;q) be the set of q-arbitrage-free
renements of
o
i 2 CB, (partially) ordered by the relation  of Denition 1. Then,
either R
(
o
i;q)
= ?, and we let
o
(V;
o
i; q) = ?, or R(oi;q) 6= ?, which we henceforth
assume. Along Denition 1, let f
o

k
i gk2K be a chain in R(oi;q), fP
k
i g := fP (
o

k
i )gk2K be
the related chain of supports, Pi := [k2KP ki  P (
o
i) be compact, and
o
i 2 CB be the
class of beliefs with support P (
o
i) = Pi. By construction,
o

k
i 
o
i 
o
i, for all k 2 K.
Assume, by contraposition, that
o
i =2 R(oi;q)
, i.e., from Denition 3, there exists
z 2 RJ , such that  q  z > 0 and V (!)  z > 0 for every ! 2 Pi, with at least one strict
15
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inequality, say (V (!)  z  q  z) > 0 for ! 2 Pi. Since,
o

k
i is q-arbitrage-free and P
k
i  Pi,
for every k 2 K, the above relations imply, from Denition 3, that  q  z = 0 and
V (!k)  z = 0, for every (k; !k) 2 KP ki . Since V is continuous, the relation V (!)  z > 0,
which holds for ! 2 Pi := [k2KP ki , implies that there exists k 2 K and !
k
i 2 P
k
i , such
that V (!ki )  z > 0, in contradiction with the above equalities. This contradiction
yields
o
i 2 R(oi;q)
, hence, from above,
o
i is an upper bound of the chain f
o

k
i gk2K in
R
(
o
i;q)
. From Zorns Lemma (Aliprantis-Border, 1999, p. 14), R
(
o
i;q)
has a maximal
element, i.e., a renement,
o
(V;
o
i; q) 
o
i, which meets Conditions (ii) and (iii) of
Claim 4. The last part of Claim 4 results from Denition 3 and from above. 
Denition 4 Let a class structure of payo¤s and beliefs, [V; (
o
i)], and a price, q 2 RJ ,
be given. The information (set) revealed by price q to the generic ith agent is the
(possibly empty) set,
o
(V;
o
i; q) 2 ? [ CB, of Claim 4, also denoted by
o
(
o
i; q).
3.3 Structures of beliefs revealed by prices
The following Claim characterizes no-arbitrage prices along Denition 3.
Claim 5 Let a price, q 2 RJ , a class structure of payo¤s and beliefs, [V; (
o
i)], and
the set collection, (
o
(V;
o
i; q)) := (
o
(V;
o
i; q))i2I, along Denition 4, be given. Then,
the following statements are equivalent:
(i) q is a no-arbitrage price of [V; (
o
i)], i.e., q 2 Q[V; (
o
i)];
(ii) (
o
(V;
o
i; q)) is the coarsest q-arbitrage-free renement of (
o
i);
(iii) (
o
(V;
o
i; q))  (
o
i), i.e., (
o
(V;
o
i; q)) is a renement of (
o
i);
(iv) \mi=1P (
o
(V;
o
i; q)) 6= ?, i.e., (
o
(V;
o
i; q)) is a class structure of beliefs.
Proof (i)) (ii) Let q 2 Q[V; (
o
i)] be given. Then, along Denition 3, there exists
a q-arbitrage-free renement, (
o


i ), of (
o
i), which we set as given, and, for each i 2 I,
the set, R
(
o
i;q)
, of q-arbitrage-free renements of
o
i is non-empty. Resuming exactly
16
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the proof of Claim 4, at this stage (R
(
o
i;q)
6= ?) and in all subsequent steps, we let
the reader check that the set
o
(V;
o
i; q) (of Denition 4) is non-empty and meets
Conditions (i)-(ii)-(iii) of Claim 4. The latter Conditions imply that, for each i 2 I,
o
(V;
o
i; q) is the unique coarsest q-arbitrage-free renement of
o
i, hence, from above,
that
o


i 
o
(V;
o
i; q) 
o
i. Since (
o


i ) 2 CSB, the latter assertions, which hold and
are written for each i 2 I, imply that the collection (
o
(V;
o
i; q)) is a renement of (
o
i)
and, moreover, the (unique) coarsest q-arbitrage-free renement of (
o
i).
The relations (ii)) (iii)) (iv) are immediate from Denition 1.
(iv)) (i) If (
o
(V;
o
i; q)) 2 CSB, then, (
o
(V;
o
i; q)) renes (
o
i), from Claim 4-(i), and
is q-arbitrage-free, from Claim 4-(ii), that is, q 2 Qc[V; (
o
(V;
o
i; q))]  Q[V; (
o
i)]. 
Denition 5 Let a class structure of payo¤s and beliefs, [V; (
o
i)], and no-arbitrage
price, q, be given. The coarsest q-arbitrage-free renement of (
o
i) along Claim 5,
(
o
(V;
o
i; q)), also denoted by (
o
(
o
i; q)), is said to be revealed by price q 2 Q[V; (
o
i)].
A renement, (
o


i )  (
o
i) (or, equivalently, (i )  (i) 2 
m
i=1
o
i) is said to be price-
revealable, if there exists q 2 RJ , such that (
o


i ) = (
o
(V;
o
i; q)) (or (i ) 2 
m
i=1
o
(V;
o
i; q)).
Remark 5 As shown in Cornet-de Boisde¤re (2002), given ((
o
i); q) 2 CSBQ[(
o
i)],
there may exist other q-arbitrage-free renements of (
o
i) than the coasest, (
o
(
o
i; q)).
Claim 6 shows that the coarsest arbitrage-free renement is always price-revealable.
Claim 6 Let (
o
i) 2 CSB be given. Along Claim 3 and Denition 5, let
o
[(
o
i)] and
(
o
(
o
i; q)), for every q 2 Q[V; (
o
i)], be, respectively, the coarsest arbitrage-free, and
coarsest q-arbitrage-free, renements of (
o
i). Then, the following assertion holds:
(i) ? 6= fq 2 RJ :
o
[(
o
i)] = (
o
(
o
i; q))g = Qc[V;
o
[(
o
i)]].
Hence,
o
[(
o
i)] can be revealed by any price q 2 Qc[V;
o
[(
o
i)]]. Moreover, if [V; (
o
i)] is
arbitrage-free,
o
[(
o
i)] = (
o
i) and (
o
i) can be revealed by any price q 2 Qc[V; (
o
i)] 6= ?.
17
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Proof Let (
o
i) 2 CSB be given and let
o
[(
o
i)] and (
o
(
o
i; q)), for every q 2 Q[V; (
o
i)],
be dened as in Claim 6. From Claim 3 and Denition 3, the set Qc[V;
o
[(
o
i)]] is
non-empty. Let q 2 Qc[V;
o
[(
o
i)]] be given. Then, from Claim 5, the relation
o
[(
o
i)] 
(
o
(
o
i; q)) holds, since
o
[(
o
i) is q-arbitrage-free, whereas, from Claim 3, the converse
relation, (
o
(
o
i; q)) 
o
[(
o
i)], also holds, since
o
[(
o
i) is the coarsest arbitrage-free
renement. Hence,
o
[(
o
i) = (
o
(
o
i; q))  (
o
i). We have thus shown the relations:
? 6= Qc[V;
o
[(
o
i)]]  fq 2 RJ :
o
[(
o
i)] = (
o
(
o
i; q))g. Conversely, let q 2 RJ be given,
such that [(
o
i)] = (
o
(
o
i; q)). Then, from Claim 5, [(
o
i)] is q-arbitrage-free, i.e.,
q 2 Qc[V;
o
[(
o
i)]]. Hence, fq 2 RJ :
o
[(
o
i)] = (
o
(
o
i; q))g  Qc[V;
o
[(
o
i)]] and, from above,
assertion (i) holds. The rest is immediate from the denitions and assertion (i). 
We now characterize prices, which reveal a self-attainable renement.
Claim 7 Let (
o
i) 2 CSB & q 2 RJ be given. Let AS be the non-empty set of arbitrage-
free self-attainable renements of (
o
i). The following assertions are equivalent:
(i) q 2 [
(
o


i
)2AS
Qc[V; (
o


i )], i.e., q is a self-attainable no-arbitrage price;
(ii) (
o
(
o
i; q)) is a self-attainable renement of (
o
i).
Proof From Claim 3 and Remark 4, the set AS contains both the symmetric self-
attainable and the coarsest arbitrage-free renements of (
o
i). The relation (i)) (ii)
is a direct consequence of Claim 5. Moreover, if assertion (ii) holds, (
o
(
o
i; q))  (
o
i)
is q-arbitrage-free, from Claim 5, i.e., q 2 Qc[V; (
o
(
o
i; q))], and assertion (i) holds. 
We now examine how agents, endowed with no price model a la Radner, may
still update their beliefs from observing markets, namely, prices, if they can meet
agreement, or exchange opportunities, if this is not the case.
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4 Inferring information from prices or trade opportunities
This Section generalizes Cornet-de Boisde¤re (2009) to the above economy E.
4.1 Sequential renement through prices
Throughout, we let a class structure, [V; (
o
i)], of payo¤s and beliefs, an agent,
i 2 I, and an asset price, q 2 RJ , be given. We study how the generic ith agent,
endowed with the initial expectation set, P (
o
i), along Denition 1, may narrow
down in steps her expectation set from observing the current price, q, on nancial
markets, without having any model of how market prices are determined. To that
aim, we dene, by induction on n 2 N, two sequences, fAni gn2N and fP
n
i gn2N, of
sub-sets of ?[M, called, respectively, the arbitrage and (interim) expectation sets:
 for n = 0, we let A0i = ? and P
0
i := P (
o
i);
 for n 2 N arbitrary, with Ani and P
n
i dened at step n, we let A
n+1
i := P
n+1
i := ?,
if Pni = ?, and, otherwise:
An+1i := f! 2 P
n
i : 9z 2 R
J ;  q  z > 0; V (!)  z > 0 and V (!)  z > 0; 8! 2 Pni g;
Pn+1i := P
n
i n A
n+1
i , i.e., the agent rules out expectations, granting an arbitrage.
Claim 8 Let (
o
i) 2 CSB and q 2 RJ be given. Let
o
(
o
i; q) be the set of Denition 4
and fAni gn2N and fP
n
i gn2N, be dened from above. Let P (
o
(
o
i; q)) be empty, if
o
(
o
i; q)
is empty, and the support of
o
(
o
i; q) 2 CB otherwise. The following assertions hold:
(i) 9N 2 N : 8n > N; Ani = ? and P
n
i = P
N
i ;
(ii) PNi = lim P
n
i = P (
o
(
o
i; q)), along assertion (i).
Proof Let (
o
i) 2 CSB and q 2 RJ be given, and let
o
(
o
i; q), P (
o
(
o
i; q)), fAni gn2N
and fPni gn2N be dened as in Claim 8 and denote P

i := \
m
i=1P
n
i = limn!1 & P
n
i .
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With a non-restrictive convention that the empty set is included in any other
set, we show, rst, by induction on n 2 N, that P (
o
(
o
i; q))  P
n
i , for every n 2 N.
Indeed, from Claim 4, the relation P (
o
(
o
i; q))  P
0
i holds for n = 0. Assume, now, by
contraposition, that, for some n 2 N, P (
o
(
o
i; q))  P
n
i and P (
o
(
o
i; q)) * P
n+1
i . Then,
there exist ! 2 P (
o
(
o
i; q)) \ A
n+1
i and z 2 R
J , such that  q  z > 0, V (!)  z > 0 and
V (!)  z > 0, for every ! 2 P (
o
(
o
i; q))  P
n
i , which contradicts Claim 5, along which
(V; P (
o
(
o
i; q))) is q-arbitrage-free, if non-empty.
Hence, the relation P (
o
(
o
i; q))  P
n
i holds for every n 2 N.
Assume, rst, that P i := \n2NP
n
i = ?. Since the sequence fP
n
i gn2N is non-increasing
and made of compact or empty sets, there exists N 2 N, such that Pni = A
n
i = ?, for
every n > N , and, from above, assertions (i)-(ii) of Claim 8 hold.
Assume, next, that P i 6= ?, then, P

i , a non-empty intersection of compact sets,
is compact, and, from above, P (
o
(
o
i; q))  P

i . Along Denition 1, we let
o


i 2 CB be
the (unique) renement of
o
i, dened by P (
o


i ) = P

i , and consider two cases.
First, we assume that assertion (i) of Claim 8 holds and let N 2 N be such that
AN+1i = ?. Then, by construction, P
N
i = P

i , and
o


i 
o
i is q-arbitrage-free (since
AN+1i = ?), which implies, from Claim 4,
o


i 
o
(
o
i; q). The latter relation yields
P (
o


i ) := P

i  P (
o
(
o
i; q)), and, from above, assertions (i)-(ii) of Claim 8 hold again.
Second, we assume, by contraposition, that assertion (i) of Claim 8 fails, that is:
8n 2 N; 9(!n; zn) 2 Pni  Z
n
i :  q  zn > 0; V (!n)  zn > 0 and V (!)  zn > 0; 8! 2 P
n
i ,
in which we may take Zni := fz 2 R
J : kzk = 1; z 2 hZoni i
?
g orthogonal to
Zoni := fz 2 R
J :  q  z = 0; V (!)  z = 0; 8! 2 Pni g.
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Since fPni gn2N is decreasing, the sequence of vector spaces, fZ
on
i g, is non-decreasing
in RJ , hence, stationary. We let N 2 N be such that Zni = Z
N
i , for every n > N , and
denote simply Zi := ZNi and Z
o
i := Z
oN
i . Since P
0
i Zi is compact, we may assume there
exists (!; z) = limn!1(!n; zn) 2 P 0i Zi. We recall that Zi and Z
o
i are orthogonal and
notice that Zoi = fz 2 R
J :  q  z = 0; V (!)  z = 0; 8! 2 P i g.
The above relations on (!n; zn), for each n 2 N, and the continuity of V and of
the scalar product imply that  q  z > 0 and V (!)  z > 0, for every ! 2 P i , with one
strict inequality, since z 2 Zi, is orthogonal to Zoi and such that kzk = 1. Hence,
there exists ! 2 P i , such that V (!
) z > 0. By construction, P i := \n2NP
n
i is disjoint
from Ai := [n2NA
n
i . Hence, !
 =2 Ai . From the continuity of the scalar product and
above, there exists n > N , such that V (!)  zn > 0, which implies, from the above
relations on (!n; zn), that ! 2 An+1i , in contradiction with the fact that !
 =2 Ai . This
contradiction proves that assertion (i) of Claim 8 holds, and completes the proof. 
The joint resuls of Claims 4, 5 and 8 yield the following Denition.
Denition 6 Given a class structure of payo¤s and beliefs, [V; (
o
i)], and price, q 2 RJ ,
we let, for each i 2 I, fPni gn2N and P

i := limn!1 P
n
i , be, respectively, the set sequence
and the nal expectation set, dened above by induction. The information revealed
by price q to the generic ith agent along the no-arbitrage principle is the (possibly
empty) set of beliefs, denoted by
o
(V;
o
i; q) 2 ? [ CB, whose support is P i . This
set coincides with the information set,
o
(V;
o
i; q), revealed by price q of Denition
4. If q 2 RJ is a no-arbitrage price, the renement revealed by price q along the
no-arbitrage principle is the class structure, (
o
(V;
o
i; q))  (
o
i), dened from above,
which coincides with the renement, (
o
(V;
o
i; q)), revealed by price q of Denition 5.
The meaning of the no-arbitrage principle of Denition 6 is now clear. Agents
having no clue of how market prices are determined can still update their beliefs
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from observing current prices so as to rule out arbitrage. They will, in any case, reach
their nal update after a nite number of inference steps. As long as markets have
not reached a no-arbitrage price, traders cannnot agree on prices and a sequential
equilibrium may not exist. Claims 5 and 8 above show, jointly, that agents have
common expectations - a necessary condition for sequential equilibrium to exist -
if, and only if, the asset price is a no-arbitrage price (and such prices exist).
Along the same Claims, once markets have reached a no-arbitrage price, decen-
tralized agents, who update their beliefs from the no-arbitrage principle, may infer
a renement, agree on current prices, and share common forecasts. From Claim 5, 7
and 8, whenever the no-arbitrage price is self-attainable, the renement inferred is
self-attainable. We now show that a similar renement process is possible without
observing such a price. Agents may infer information from trade opportunities on
markets, in a way which leads to preclude arbitrage, after nitely many inference
steps. Then, agents infer the coarsest arbitrage-free renement of Claim 3, which
may also be revealed, along Claim 6, by any of its common no-arbitrage prices.
4.2 Sequential renement through trade
Throughout, we let a class structure, [V; (
o
i)], be given. We study how agents may
narrow down in steps their expectation sets from observing exchange opportunities
on nancial markets. As above, we dene, by induction on n 2 N, two sequences,
fAngn2N := f
m
i=1A
n
i gn2N and fP
ngn2N := f
m
i=1P
n
i gn2N, of sub-sets of (? [M)
m:
 we let A0i = ? and P
0
i := P (
o
i), for each i 2 I, and A0 := mi=1A
0
i and P
0 := mi=1P
0
i ;
 with An := mi=1A
n
i and P
n := mi=1P
n
i dened at step n 2 N, we let, for each i
0 2 I:
An+1i0 := f! 2 P
n
i0 : 9(zi) 2 (R
J)m;
Pm
i=1 zi=0; -qzi>0; V (!)zi0>0; V (!i)zi>0; 8(i; !i) 2 IP
n
i g
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Pn+1i0 := P
n
i0 n A
n+1
i0 , i.e., agents rule out expectations, granting an arbitrage,
An+1 := mi=1A
n+1
i and P
n+1 := mi=1P
n+1
i .
Claim 10 Let (
o
i) 2 CSB be given. We will denote simply (
o


i ) :=
o
[(
o
i)] 2 CSB
the coarsest arbitrage-free renement of (
o
i) along Claim 3, and let, for each i 2 I,
P i := P (
o


i ) be the support of
o


i 2 CB, and P
 := mi=1P

i . Let fA
ngn2N and fPngn2N,
be dened from above. Then, the following assertions hold:
(i) 9N 2 N : 8n > N; An = ? and Pn = PN ;
(ii) PN = limn!1 P
n = P , along assertion (i).
Proof Let (
o
i) 2 CSB be given, and let (
o


i ), P
 := mi=1P

i := 
m
i=1P (
o


i ), fA
ngn2N :=
fmi=1A
n
i gn2N and fP
ngn2N := f
m
i=1P
n
i gn2N be dened as in Claim 10 and denote P
 :=
mi=1P

i := \
m
i=1P
n = limn!1 & P
n.
We show, rst, by induction on n 2 N, that P i  P
n
i , for every pair (i; n) 2 I  N.
Let i0 2 I be given. From Claim 3, the relation P i0  P
0
i0 holds for n = 0. Assume, now,
by contraposition, that, for some n 2 N, P i0  P
n
i0 and P

i0 * P
n+1
i0 . Then, there exist
! 2 P i0 \ A
n+1
i0 and (zi) 2 (R
J)m, such that
Pm
i=1 zi = 0, V (!)  zi0 > 0 and V (!i)  zi > 0,
for every (i; !i) 2 I  P i  I  P
n
i , which (from Claim 2) contradicts Claim 3, along
which [V; (
o


i )] is arbitrage-free.
Hence, the relation P i  P
n
i holds for every pair (i; n) 2 I  N, which implies
that P  := mi=1P

i := \
m
i=1P
n is a compact set, such that P  := mi=1P

i  P
. Let
(
o


i ) 2 CSB be the renement of (
o
i), dened by P (
o


i ) = P

i , for each i 2 I. From
above,
o


i renes
o


i . We now consider two cases.
First, assume that assertion (i) of Claim 10 holds and let N 2 N satisfy that condi-
tion. Then, PN = P , and the renement, (
o


i ), is q-arbitrage-free (since A
N+1
i = ?,
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for each i 2 I), which implies, from Claim 3, that
o


i 
o


i , hence, from above, that
o


i =
o


i , that is, assertions (i) and (ii) of Claim 10 hold.
Second, assume, by contraposition, that assertion (i) of Claim 10 fails, that is:
8n 2 N; 9(!nin ; (z
n
i )) 2 P
n
in
Zn : V (!nin)z
n
in
> 0 and V (!i)z
n
i > 0; 8(i; !i) 2 IP
n
i , where
Zn := f(zi) 2 (RJ)m :
Pm
i=1 zi 2
Pm
i=1 Z
on
i ; k(zi)k = 1; (zi) 2 
m
i=1 hZ
on
i i
?
g, in which hZoni i
?
is, for each i 2 I, the orthogonal complement of Zoni := fz 2 R
J : V (!)  z = 0; 8! 2 Pni g.
Since fPngn2N is decreasing, the sequence of vector spaces, fmi=1Z
on
i g, is non-
decreasing in (RJ)m, hence, stationary. We let N 2 N be such that Zn = ZN , for every
n > N , and denote simply Z := ZN and Zo := mi=1Z
oN
i . To simplify, we will assume,
non restrictively, that in = 1, for every n 2 N. Since P 01  Z is compact, we may
assume there exists (!; (zi )) = limn!1(!
n
1 ; (z
n
i )) 2 P
0
1  Z. We recall that Z and Z
o
are orthogonal and notice that Zo = mi=1fz 2 R
J : V (!)  z = 0; 8! 2 P i g.
The above relations on (!n1 ; (z
n
i )), for each n 2 N, and the continuity of V and of
the scalar product imply that V (!)  zi > 0, for every pair (i; !) 2 I  P

i , with one
strict inequality, since (zi ) 2 Z, is orthogonal to Z
o and such that k(zi )k = 1. Hence,
there exists (i; !) 2 I P i , such that V (!
)  zi > 0. By construction, P

i := \n2NP
n
i
is disjoint from Ai := [n2NA
n
i . Hence, !
 =2 Ai .
From the denition of
Pm
i=1 Z
on
i and above, for each n 2 N, there exist (attainable)
portfolios, (zni ) 2 R
JI , such that
Pm
i=1 zi = 0 and V (!i)  z
n
i = V (!i)  z
n
i > 0, for every
(i; !i) 2 I  P
n
i . From the continuity of the scalar product, the above relations,
V (!)zi > 0 and z

i = lim z
n
i , imply, for n 2 N large enough, V (!
)zni = V (!
)zni > 0,
with ! 2 Pni , hence, !
 2 An+1i , from the latter relations on (z
n
i ). This contradicts
the fact that ! =2 Ai . Hence, assertion (i) holds, which completes the proof. 
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We have now extended to the innite dimensional economy, E, the basic arbitrage
properties of the Cornet-de Boisde¤re model (2002-2009). Proving the extended
properties was a perequisite to study existence of the C.F.E. in the general setting,
where agents are, both, asymmetrically informed about the future, and endowed
with private idiosyncratic beliefs on forthcoming prices.
In the traditional perfect foresight model, we are used to deal with locally iso-
lated predictable equilibria, whose price is common knowledge. When consumers
are prone to uncertainty between several private forecasts, a single prediction is no
longer possible. Then, the set of sequential equilibria is easily shown to be typically
uncountable, with di¤erent equilibria related to di¤erent possible private beliefs.
Such an indeterminacy leads to dene a minimum uncertainty set, as the set
of all prices, which might prevail as a sequential equilibrium price tomorrow, for
some structure of beliefs today. When beliefs are private or prone to change, any
such price is, a priori, possible. We already know that this set is non-empty in
a standard economy with purely nancial markets, since this economy admits a
perfect foresigth (possibly price-revealed) equilibrium (see De Boisde¤re, 2007). In
a companion paper, we will extend this result to all types of nancial markets.
On the one hand, it is clear that agents endowed with private beliefs need include
the minimum uncertainty set into their expectation sets, if their forecasts are to be
correct (along Denition 2 above). On the other hand, we will show a converse
result. Namely, that a standard economy, where agents expectations embed that
set, always admits a correct foresight (possibly price-revealed) equilibrium, whatever
the structure of payo¤s and beliefs of the economy. In particular, a correct foresight
equilibrium exists in the standard cases, following Hart (1974) and Radner (1979),
where the perfect foresight and the rational expectation equilibria fail to exist.
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